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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
law" means the whole law which encompasses conflict of law rules.
Whenever the word law means something less than the whole law it
does so only because it has been expressly delimited. Since Congress
did not delimit the word law under the Tort Claims Act, the states'
conflict of laws rules continue to operate under the Act.
DENNIS G. LINDNER
Securities: Liability of a Partner-Director for Short-Swing
Profits-A partner of Lehman Bros., an investment firm having over
one hundred partners, succeeded a fellow partner as a member of the
board of directors of Tidewater Associated Oil Company, a corporation
the stock of which was traded on a national exchange. During his ten-
ure as a director of Tidewater, the investment firm of which he was a
partner bought and sold 50,000 shares of stock in this corporation
within a 6 month period at a profit of $98,686.77.
Plaintiff, a stockholder of Tidewater, sues on behalf of the company
under section 16 (b)1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to recover
with interest all the short swing profits2 which the partnership derived
while the co-defendant partner served as a director of Tidewater. On
cross-appeals from a judgment dismissing the complaint against the
partnership and allowing recovery against the partner-director for his
proportionate share of the profits only, the decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and by the United States Supreme Court. 3
The Securities Exchange Act was passed amidst widespread revela-
tions of the use of undisclosed information by insiders who traded se-
curities listed on national exchanges. Prior to passage of the Act specu-
lation by insiders in the securities of their corporations was a widely
I "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such
profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same
thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the
date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of
the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt and not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection." 15 U.S.C.
§78p (b) (1952).
2"... that is profits earned within a six months' period by the purchase and
sale of securities, .... " Blan v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
3 Blau v. Lehman, 268 F. 2d 786 (1960) ; 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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condemned evil.4 Yet, generally, prior to the passage of this Act, ag-
grieved stockholders had no right to recover for the corporation any
inside profits derived by an officer, director, or other insider.5 Under
special circumstances an insider might have been held liable as under
the rule of Strong v. Repide.0 However, even this remedy was inade-
quate because of the heavy burden of proof imposed upon the stock-
holders.7 The introduction to the act specifically enumerates the reasons
which compelled Congress to act, ranging from the effect on the public
welfare during national emergencies to the effect of excessive specula-
tion on the expansion and contraction of credit.8
4Smolowe v. Dolendo Corporation, 136 F. 2d 231, 235 (1943).
5 Blabon v. Hay, 269 Miss. 401, 169 N.E. 268 (1929); Walsh v. Goulden, 130
Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266
(1922).
6 "It is not here sought to make defendant responsible for his actions, not alone
and simply in his character as a director, but because, in consideration of all
the existing circumstances above detailed, it became the duty of the defendant,
acting in good faith, to state the facts before making the purchase .... The
case before us seems a plain one for holding that, under the circumstances de-
tailed, there was a legal obligation on the part of the defendant to make the
disclosure." Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 432-434 (1909).7 Liability would apply to the facts only and, even then it could be overridden
by a primary duty of the director to the corporation to keep information se-
cret. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
s "For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as com-
monly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are
affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for
regulation and control of such transactions by officers, directors, and principal
security holders, to require appropriate reports, and to impose requirements
necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effec-
tive in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal
taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system
and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in such transactions:
(1) Such transactions (a) are carried on in large volume by the public
generally and in large part originate outside the States in which the exchanges
and over-the-counter markets are located and/or are effected by means of the
mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; (b) constitute an import-
ant part of the current interstate commerce; (c) involve in large part the se-
curities of issuers engaged in interstate commerce; (d) involve the use of
credit, interstate commerce, and directly affect and influence the volume of
interstate commerce; and affect the national credit.
(2) The prices established and offered in such transactions are generally
disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries
and constitute a basis for determining and establishing the prices at which
securities are bought and sold, the amount of certain taxes owing to the
United States and to the several States by owners, buyers, and sellers of se-
curities, and the value of collateral for bank loans.
(3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are
susceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices
gives rise to excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable ex-
pansion and unreasonable contraction of the volume of credit available for
trade, transportation, and industry in interstate commerce, (b) hinder the
proper appraisal of the value of securities and thus prevent a fair calculation
of taxes owing to the United States and to the several States by owners,
buyers, and sellers of securities, and (c) prevent the fair valuation of collat-
eral for bank loans and/or obstruct the effective operation of the national
banking system and Federal Reserve System.
(4) National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and
the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden inter-
1962]
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Section 16(a) 9 requires officers, directors, and beneficial owners of
more than ten per cent of the stock of the issuing corporation to disclose
their equity interests to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Fur-
ther, such parties under 16(b) are liable for any short swing profits.10
Designed to protect stockholders and the buying public, section 16 re-
quires both full disclosure and absolute liability for any short swing
profits.
Specifically, Section 16(b) is designed to prevent this reaping of
short swing profits by one enjoying an inside position. In order to render
a director, officer, or principal stockholder liable for his profits made on
short swing speculation it is not necessary that proof be made of an
actual unfair use of inside information by such individual. The Su-
preme Court has construed the Act to intend an objective rather than
a subjective measure of proof.1 It has been said that a federal court,
in applying 16(b), must suppose that Congress intended the statute to
be thoroughgoing and to squeeze all possible profits out of stock trans-
actions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any con-
flict between the selfish interests of a fiduciary officer, director, or stock-
holder and the faithful performance of his duty.' 2 Significant therefore
is the feature that an insider is liable once it is shown that he has re-
alized a short-term profit, whether or not an actual use of advance in-
formation is shown.
Plaintiff relied on three basic contentions in this appeal. First, con-
tending that Lehman Brothers had deputized the partner, he insisted
that it was in fact a director within the contemplation of 16(b). Sec-
ondly, he insisted that should the court find no deputization they should
nevertheless hold the partnership liable because a partnership is an
inseparable entity and since one member was obviously an insider the
whole partnership should also be considered an insider. Finally, it was
contended, under any conditions the partnership should be held liable
on a policy basis so as to prevent the unfair use of information by such
state commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, in-
tensified and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctua-
tions of security prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and
markets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such
great expense as to burden the national credit. 15 U.S.C. §78b.
9 "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted
security), which is registered on a national securities exchange, or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of
registration of such security or within ten days after he becomes such bene-
ficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the exchange (and a dupli-
cate original thereof with the Commission) indicating his ownership at the
close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have oc-
curred during such calendar month." 15 U.S.C. 78p (a).
20 Sec. 16 (b) supra note 1.
11 Smolowe v. Dolendo, supra note 4.
12 Ibid.; Park and Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984 (1947) ; Kogenn v. Schulte,
61 F. Supp. 604 (1945).
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large investment firms which, as a matter of practice, always seem to
have their partners serving as directors for other companies. Failure to
do so, plaintiff argued, will leave a large and unintended loophole in the
statute-one substantially eliminating the great Wall Street trading
firms from the statute's operation thereby defeating the very purpose of
the Securities Exchange Act.13
The Supreme Court conceded that for the purposes of 16(b) the
defendant partnership could be, under the proper circumstances, a di-
rector within the contemplation of 16(b) and thus liable for any short
swing profits accruing. Such circumstances might exist if the facts
showed the partnership to be actually functioning through a deputy in
the form of the partner-director. But the court refused to upset the
lower court's finding of fact that the partner had not been deputized.
Nor did they accept the plaintiff's interpretation of §3(a) (9)14 as treat-
ing a partnership as an inseparable entity. Rather, the court felt that the
purpose of §3(a) (9) was merely to make it clear that a partnership
can be treated as an entity under the statute, not that it must be. In
answer to the plaintiff's final contention they rejected any idea that
would hold such a partnership liable solely on a policy basis. In so
holding they relied on the fact that Congress had rejected an original
draft of the Securities Exchange Act which would have made all profits
received by anyone, insider or not, to whom some unlawful disclosure
had been made recoverable by the company. Significant also in the
court's mind was the fact that Congress had done nothing to the Act
during the eight year period since the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
refused, in the Rattner case,15 to apply §16(b) to Lehman Brothers in
circumstances substantially similar to those in the present case.
If the trial court had found the partnership a director within the
contemplation of the Act they would have been liable to the corporation
for such profits regardless of whether they had in fact acted on confi-
dential information known to them or available to them. Liability is
imposed merely if one is an officer or sits on the board of directors and
concurrently profits on a short swing basis while dealing in the corpora-
tion's stock. However, the court emphasized that the act itself "does not
purport to impose its extraordinary liability on any person or fiduciary
unless he or it is a director, officer, or beneficial owner of more than
10 per cent of any class of equity security."' 16 This followed the previous
pattern as set down by the majority opinion of the circuit court and
which in turn was solidly based on the decision in Rattner v. Lehman.
13 Blau v. Lehman, 286 F. 2d 786, 799 (1960).
14 "The term 'person' means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an asso-
ciation, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organiza-
tion." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §3, 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78c
(9) (1952).
15 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 82 S. Ct. 451, 456 (1961).
' Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F. 2d 564 (1952).
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In the Rattner decision the court held the individual director liable
for his proportionate share only, saying that the partnership, not being
a director, was therefore not subject to the penalties of 16(b). Further,
the court held that loophole or not, "legislative history indicates that
omission of any provision for such liability was intentional."17 Important
in our consideration is that Justice Learned Hand rendered a concurring
opinion in which he stated that if in fact the director had been deputized
to represent its interest as a director on the board the other partners
would be liable for such short swing profits. Relying heavily on the
Rattner case, the circuit court majority in the present case brushed
aside as dicta Hand's theory of deputization. As makeweight, and prob-
ably to protect themselves in the event of an appeal, the majority in-
sisted that even if Hand's theory were correct it would not apply to the
facts involved here since no deputization had occurred. Justice Clark's
vigorous dissent relied on concepts of partnership law which hold that
one partner must be charged with knowledge of the actions of the
others. Insisting that the majority of the circuit court as well as the
majority decision in Rattner had placed an erroneous interpretation on
the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act he claimed the
change from the earlier drafts indicated only that Congress favored an
automatic application of the act without having to prove the partner's
intent."" The theory of the dissent is that the clause was eliminated so
as to avoid the necessity of proof and merely apply the objective test of
whether or not one actually used inside information.
It would appear that attempting to discover the true and significant
legislative intent from the failure of Congress to pass the Act in its
original form is at best a hazardous task. There are many hidden factors
which will operate constantly to force concessions and compromises in
our legislative process. Here there seem to be two equally plausible
interpretations of what that intent was. The majority insists that Con-
gressional failure to pass the original draft, which would have imposed
liability upon anyone securing information from an insider, evidenced
a clear intent to limit the law's sphere of liability. Equally persuasive
is the position that history really points the other way and in favor of
an automatic application of the statute without proving the parties' in-
tent. Further, the failure of Congress to act in the relatively short eight
year period following Rattner is also of little help. It may be indicative
of nothing more than the lack of a strong advocate to push for the
necessary changes or that other pressing business has delayed any action
by Congress. Any inference of legislative intent from Congressional
inaction has been held a nebulous process by the Supreme Court itself. 9
17 Id., at 566.
1S Blau v. Lehmnan, supra note 13, at 794.
19 James v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1948).
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Congress is not required to make an affirmative move every time a lower
court indulges in an erroneous interpretation of a statute in order to
prevent the application of the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. Lower
federal court decisions have likewise held that where Congress has not
re-enacted a specific clause of a statute after administrative or judicial
construction but has merely remained silent the inference that Congress
has thereby approved such construction is not of much weight.2 0
In the present case the Court refused to overrule the trial court's
fiindings of fact which had been affirmed by the court of appeals. Such
findings were felt not to be clearly erroneous.21 But the court did- differ
from the Rattner precedent in one important respect. It accepted
Learned Hand's concurring opinion from Rattner, which advocated
that a partnership could be a director within the contemplation of the
Act where deputization had occurred. In so holding the Court would
seem to have gone as far as they presently can. Having failed to reverse
Rattner they did leave a hook upon which liability might attach where
the plaintiff stockholder is able to prove an agency relationship. As to
large investment partnerships, this case has destroyed any hope of im-
posing liability merely by proving that a fellow partner was a director
and that short swing profits were made. But neither has 16(b) been
entirely destroyed as would have followed an absolute reliance on the
Rattner principle. It would seem entirely likely that in future cases the
district courts will be more prone to find deputization under fact situ-
ations similar to these, now that the theory has been accepted.2 At least
it will be the job of the attorney to so argue if he maintains any hope
of recovering short swing profits from a partnership under 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In future cases which are so argued,
should the courts continue to find no agency where the partners of the
director realize short swing profits after consultation with the partner
director, it would then truly be a dilution of the fiduciary principle that
Congress wrote into Section 16 of the Act.
20Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F. 2d 259 (1947); Mitchell v.
C.I.R., 300 F. 2d 533 (1962).
21 Blatt v. Lehman, supra note 15, at 82 S. Ct. 452.
22 Consider the following language which is used in interpreting a fact situation
in an action under a different statute but which has some pertinence to this
reasoning:
... substantial fees are also obtained by Lehman Brothers from merger
negotiations. Profits from the fees are shared by the partners. Section 409(a)
companies, with Lehman Brothers partners as directors, need and use both
types of services, and the partner directors seek such business for the partner-
ship. In doing so they act as representatives of the partnership. (Italics added.)
It follows that they act as representatives of fellow partners, some of whom
are directors of air carriers. Is this representation within the meaning of the
statute? Does Mr. Thomas, to use his case as illustrative, who is a Lehman
Brothers partner and also a director of National Airlines, represent, as director
of National Airlines, Mr. Lehman, another Lehman Brothers partner and di-
rector of Pan American? We think that the affirmative answer of the Board
should not be disturbed... ." Lehman v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 209 F. 2d
289, 292-294 (1953).
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Therefore, at present a partnership is not subject to the provisions
of Section 16 if one of its partners is a director of a corporation unless
deputization is proven. This imposes a difficult burden of proof in an
action against such a partnership to recover short swing profits. Al-
though inequitable on its face, the courts may balance the scales of
justice in the future by making a more liberal and common sense ap-
praisal of evidence indicating deputization in fact. If in fact such a
liberal approach is not followed it will then be incumbent on Congress
to act, if any teeth are to remain in the Act. Likewise, only Congres-
sional amendment of 16(b) will impose liability upon a partnership for
short swing profits without proof of deputization where one of its
members is a director of the company at whose expense the partnership
so profited.
For comparison purposes, it might be pointed out that the courts
did not allow one other devastating wedge to be driven into the Act.
Namely, the attempt of the partner-director to waive his right to any
profit made by the partnership from the purchase of such stock and
thus disclaim any individual liability for his proportionate share. This
scheme was disallowed under the theory that such profits were never-
theless in contemplation of law realized by him. The court of appeals
felt that allowing such waiver would be too wide a breach in the intent
of the law.2 3 It might be questioned why the Court of Appeals wasn't
equally concerned with the breach in the intent of the law which they
were prepared to allow in freeing the partnership from any liability.
In the final analysis the Supreme Court may have closed the breach
substantially when it accepted the deputization theory. Only Congres-
sional action or federal courts concerned with preserving the intent of
the law and using deputization as a foothold can in fact save the Act.
Failure to do so will
leave a large and unintended loophole in the statute-one sub-
stantially eliminating the great Wall Street Trading firms from
the statute's operation.
2 4
DONALD E. MAYEW
Negligence-Abolition of the Defense of Municipal Immunity-
An action was brought on behalf of a minor by her guardian ad litem
against the City of Milwaukee to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained while playing on a City playground. The minor's father
joined in the action to recover damages for medical expenses and for
the loss of her society and companionship. The plaintiff, a three and
one-half year old child was playing on a playground known as a "tot-
lot," operated by the City of Milwaukee for the use and enjoyment of
23 Blau v. Lehman, supra note 13, at 791.
24 BIau v. Lehman, supra note 13.
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